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Abstract 
We consider, both theoretically and empirically, how different 
organization modes are aligned to govern the efficient solving of 
technological problems. The data set is a sample from the Chinese 
consumer electronics industry. Following mainly the problem solving 
perspective (PSP) within the knowledge based view (KBV), we develop 
and test several PSP and KBV hypotheses, in conjunction with competing 
transaction cost economics (TCE) alternatives, in an examination of the 
determinants of the R&D organization mode. The results show that a 
firm’s existing knowledge base is the single most important explanatory 
variable. Problem complexity and decomposability are also found to be 
important, consistent with the theoretical predictions of the PSP, but it is 
suggested that these two dimensions need to be treated as separate 
variables. TCE hypotheses also receive some support, but the estimation 
results seem more supportive of the PSP and the KBV than the TCE.  
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1. Introduction 
The emergence of the problem-solving perspective (PSP) (Macher, 2006; Nickerson 
et al., 2004) within the knowledge-based view (KBV) is a major development in the 
theory of the firm. It seeks to combine transaction cost economics (TCE) (Williamson, 
1985, 1996), complexity theory (Simon, 1962; Kauffman, 1995) and the KBV of the 
firm (Conner, 1991; Conner et al., 1996; Foss, 1996; Kogut et al., 1992) to explain 
how different organization modes are aligned to govern the efficient creation of 
valuable knowledge. In this perspective the firm is a knowledge-bearing problem 
solving entity, with the key tasks of management being the identification of valuable 
problems and the organization of solution searches. The firm, by organizing problem 
finding and problem solving efficiently, creates value. 
Although adopting a different unit of analysis than TCE, the PSP applies similarly the 
logic of ‘discriminating alignment’ (Williamson, 1991) in evaluating the relative costs 
of organizing problem solving under alternative organization modes. Based on 
previous work, a few dimensions are identified as being crucial to understanding the 
impediments to problem solving. Furthermore it is contended that as far as the costs 
and competencies of implementing solution searches for different types of problem 
are concerned, the few generic organization modes differ systematically with respect 
to incentive intensity, communication channels, dispute resolution regimes, etc. 
Finally, the PSP works out the match between problem/knowledge attributes and the 
few generic organization modes in an economizing manner that realizes superior 
search performance. 
As an emerging perspective, empirical examinations of the PSP are underdeveloped. 
Although the organizational implications of many relevant variables have been 
explored in related literature, few empirical studies (Macher, 2006; Macher et al., 
2012) are directly designed to examine the PSP. This paper seeks to address this 
shortcoming by developing and testing some PSP/KBV hypotheses in conjunction 
with other competing TCE alternatives, in an examination of the determinants of the 
firm’s R&D organization choice. The data set used relates to the Chinese consumer 
electronics industry. Following the PSP, we use measures of problem complexity 
(problem structure, intensity of knowledge-set interactions, and decomposability), and 
measures of knowledge tacitness and social distribution as predictors. In particular, 
we argue that intensity of knowledge set interactions and decomposability are 
analytically distinguishable. We therefore treat them as two separate variables and 
find that they have rather different effects on the organization choice. Moreover, with 
reference to other closely related literature, we contend that a firm’s existing 
knowledge base has profound impacts on the organization of its problem solving 
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activities, but that this dimension has been relatively ignored in the existing PSP 
literature. We introduce an appropriate measure into the analysis and find it to be a 
significant predictor. Finally, to compare the relative explanatory power of competing 
theories, a few relevant TCE variables are also included. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the PSP literature, on which basis 
hypotheses are developed. Section 3 sets the empirical context, highlighting the 
industrial background, describing the data and the variables. Section 4 presents and 
discusses the estimation results. The final section makes concluding remarks. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
In the PSP, the ‘problem’ is the basic unit of analysis and the profitable discovery of a 
high-value solution for a given problem is the central rationale for choosing the 
organization mode. It is assumed that new knowledge is generated by combining 
existing knowledge, and that a solution to a problem represents a unique combination 
of existing knowledge. For any given problem, the set of all possible combinations of 
relevant knowledge is presented as a solution landscape, the topography of which 
defines the value of each solution. Accordingly, problem solving can be seen as a 
process of searching over the solution landscape for high value solutions (Nickerson 
et al., 2004). 
Building on Simon’s work on problem solving (1962, 1973), and Kogut and Zander’s 
contributions to the KBV of the firm (1988; 1992), certain problem attributes 
(complexity, decomposability, and problem structure) and knowledge characteristics 
(tacitness and social distribution) are identified as critical dimensions for 
understanding the coordination and incentive challenges to problem solving. 
Moreover, proponents of the PSP endorse the KBV argument that hierarchies enjoy 
advantages over other organization modes, either because they facilitate knowledge 
exchange via the cultivation of organization-specific communication codes, shared 
language and routines (Grant, 1996; Kogut et al., 1992; Nelson et al., 1982) or 
because they economize on knowledge transfer by exercising authority and direction 
(Conner et al., 1996; Demsetz, 1988). They further propose the ‘discriminating 
alignment’ that defines the match between problem attributes, knowledge 
characteristics and organization modes. They argue (Leiblein et al., 2009; Macher, 
2006; Nickerson et al., 2004)  that given the above-mentioned advantages, together 
with the control mechanisms and low-powered incentives characteristic of internal 
organization (Williamson, 1991), hierarchies are better able to implement heuristic 
search through information dissemination, consensus building, and authority direction 
as compared to markets. Therefore, hierarchies realize solution search performance 
advantages for ill-structured, complex or non-decomposable problems which typically 
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involve tacit and socially distributed knowledge. By contrast, markets enjoy certain 
advantages arising from more specialized expertise (Hayek, 1945), high-powered 
incentives, decentralized decision making (Williamson, 1991) and more direct 
competitive pressures (D'Aveni et al., 1994), so that markets improve the 
speed/quality of problem solving via directional search when technological 
development involves well-structured, simple or decomposable problems. 
Somewhat paradoxically, in the PSP literature, the organizational implications of a 
firm’s existing knowledge base have been relatively ignored, although recent 
literature (Macher et al., 2012) has begun to address this issue. By contrast, in the 
KBV literature on which the PSP is grounded, it is firmly held that a firm’s existing 
knowledge base has profound organizational consequences, and this view has been 
applied to the organization of a firm’s R&D activities (e.g., Zhang et al., 2007). Given 
this, we suggest that this dimension is of particular relevance to the organization of 
problem solving and that its role should be highlighted and restored.   
2.1 Complexity (Intensity of Knowledge Set Interactions) and Decomposability 
These two dimensions were introduced to the PSP literature by Nickerson and Zenger 
(2004), with their origins traced back to Simon (1962), who argues that complexity 
obtains when a large number of parts making up a system interact in a non-simple 
way. As a system, complexity frequently takes the form of a “hierarchy” consisting of 
interrelated subsystems which, in turn, are hierarchical in nature until some 
elementary subsystem being reached at the lowest level. In a hierarchical system, the 
interactions amongst and within subsystems are distinguished, and the distinction 
between decomposable, non-decomposable and nearly decomposable systems is made 
accordingly. In a decomposable (non-decomposable) system, the interactions amongst 
subsystems are negligible (essential); whilst in a nearly decomposable system, the 
interactions amongst the subsystems are weak, but not negligible.  
On the basis of this and other subsequent contributions, the complexity of problems is 
divided into three broad categories (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004), depending on the 
extent to which relevant knowledge sets interact to produce a valuable solution 
(Leiblein et al., 2009).  
For (fully-) decomposable and low-interaction problems, interdependencies amongst 
relevant knowledge sets are negligible and decomposition into sub-problems is easy. 
Solving such problems requires little coordination and knowledge sharing. 
Impediments to knowledge sharing are less relevant. Local trial-and-error 
(directional) search through experiential learning and feedback provides certain 
advantages. Decomposability also implies that the solutions to each sub-problems are 
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additive (Leiblein et al., 2009). Sub-problems can be solved independently and 
simultaneously, with the optimal solutions to sub-problems being readily aggregated 
to give a globally optimal solution for the original problem. 
At the other extreme are non-decomposable and high-interaction problems, for which 
there exist intensive and extensive interactions amongst knowledge sets, with there 
being no practical pattern of decomposability. To solve such problems, 
cognitive/heuristic search is prescribed, calling for problem solvers to collectively 
develop cognitive maps to navigate the search (Gavetti et al., 2000; Simon, 1988) 
which in turn necessitates the sharing/exchange of knowledge amongst multiple actors. 
As specialists from different fields are cognitively constrained in the speed at which 
they can learn, the task of coordinating and aggregating specialists’ knowledge is 
demanding (Hsieh et al., 2007). Moreover, given self-interestedness, incentive 
impediments such as knowledge appropriation hazards and strategic knowledge 
accumulation hazards tend to complicate the organization of solution discovery 
(Nickerson et al., 2004). 
Between the above extremes are nearly-decomposable and moderate-interaction 
problems, for which the interactions amongst relevant knowledge sets are moderate. 
Sub-problems associated with distinctive knowledge sets can be identified, but where 
non-trivial interdependencies amongst the sub-problems remain. Near-
decomposability also means that knowledge-set interactions within sub-problems are 
greater than amongst sub-problems, so that the solution search requires some 
knowledge sharing and coordination. Accordingly, the aforementioned coordination 
and incentive challenges still apply, albeit on a reduced scale.  
With reference to the NK system (Kauffman, 1993), the complexity of a given 
problem can be defined more analytically by N (the number of relevant knowledge 
sets) and K (the magnitude of interdependence) (Nickerson et al., 2004). Simple 
problems involve a small number of relevant knowledge sets interacting in more 
predictable ways, mapping into smooth solution landscapes. Whilst complex 
problems entail a larger number of relevant knowledge sets, amongst which there are 
pervasive interactions and extensive connectivity, some of which do not allow direct 
observation, with the implied solution landscapes tending to be more rugged. 
Intuitively, the likelihood of conflicting constraints across choices also increases with 
N and K (Kauffman, 1993), the solving of complex problems thus requires the 
balancing of multiple design choices, adding to the difficulty of finding the global 
optima (Jonassen, 2004).  
Notwithstanding the above, it is noted that the existing PSP literature does not 
particularly differentiate between knowledge set interactions and problem 
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decomposability. Theoretically, they are considered as two concomitant properties 
along the same dimension (e.g., Nickerson & Zenger, 2004) and empirically they are 
treated as a single variable, captured by the same measure (Macher, 2006; Macher et 
al., 2012). However, knowledge set interactions and problem decomposability are 
analytically distinguishable and do not always move in the same direction. By 
definition (Nickerson et al., 2004; Simon, 1962), knowledge set interactions capture 
the intensity of interactions whereas decomposability depends on the pattern of such 
interactions. In particular decomposability indicates that such interactions are not 
diffuse but tend cluster tightly into nearly isolated subsets of interactions (Ethiraj et 
al., 2004).  
To illustrate the difference, consider the three NK systems in Figure 1. In each case, 
N=6, K=1 and there are 12 interactions amongst the elements. In terms of intensity of 
knowledge set interactions, the three systems are equally complex but they exhibit 
different patterns of decomposability.  
 
Figure 1: The Interaction Matrices of Three NK Systems (N=6, K=1)  
with Different Patterns of Decomposability 
 
The x value in the matrix stands for the interaction between the corresponding components. 
For example, the x value on row i and column j represents for the extent to which the 
function of element i is influenced by a change of element j. An interaction is always 
present on the diagonal since the functioning of a component depends on its own design. 
System 1 displays random interactions with no obvious pattern of decomposability. 
By contrast, system 2 and system 3 can be decomposed into two and three subsystems 
respectively. In terms of non-decomposability, system 1 is more complex than system 
2 which is, in turn, more complex than system 3.  
Given the above analysis, knowledge set interactions and problem decomposability 
are treated as two separate variables in this study and we try to differentiate their 
respective effects on the organization choice in the empirical analysis.  
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2.2 Definiteness of Problem Structure 
In the complexity theory the definiteness of problem structure has long been 
recognized as a distinct dimension of problem complexity (Simon, 1973). According 
to Simon, virtually all problems are initially ill-structured. They become well-
structured problem as problem solvers become increasingly prepared for, and more 
familiar with, them. Such a process of formalization renders problems solvable. Well-
structured problems are the outcomes of problem-defining processes and the 
accumulation of problem solving techniques.  
In the PSP literature, the dimension of problem structure was introduced by Macher 
(2006). Building mainly on Simon’s work, and with reference to the NK system, 
Macher argues that problems can be characterized along a continuum of problem 
definiteness, ranging from ill-structured to well-structured. The extent to which a 
problem is well-structured depends on the characteristics of the problem domain on 
the one hand, and on the availability and clarity of the problem solving mechanisms 
on the other. Ill-structured problems have poorly defined initial states (ambiguous N 
and K) (Jonassen, 2004) and unexpected/unknown knowledge set interactions 
(Fernandes et al., 1999), so that appropriate approaches to problem solving are 
unclear. By contrast, well-structured problems are those with well-defined initial 
states (unambiguous N and K) and well understood knowledge set interactions. 
Accordingly, the appropriate approaches to problem solving are explicit and well-
accepted. 
As these differences also have implications for problem decomposability (Ethiraj et 
al., 2004; Levinthal, 1997), a connection between problem structure and 
decomposability can be made (Macher, 2006). Ill-structured problems cannot be 
decomposed because the knowledge set interactions are often unexpected/unknown, 
making the solution searches difficult. By contrast, the knowledge set interactions for 
well-structured problems are better understood, implying solution searches are more 
transparent. 
Although the definiteness of problem structure does not affect the topography of the 
solution landscape (Leiblein et al., 2009), it does have implications for the relative 
performance of different solution search strategies. For ill-structured problems, 
heuristic search realizes performance advantages via ex ante cognitive evaluations of 
the probable consequences of particular search decisions, as opposed to ex post 
reliance on feedback from previous trials (Simon, 1991). Whilst for well-structured 
problems, directional search guided by feedback or experiential learning is more 
efficient in achieving high-value solutions compared to heuristic search (Gavetti et al., 
2000; Simon, 1973). 
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In summary, in the above two subsections it is argued that the nature and magnitude 
of coordination and incentive challenges to problem solving vary systematically 
across problem types, with which different search methods can be matched in a way 
that realizes superior search performance. Furthermore, combining insights from both 
the TCE and the KBV, it is argued that the costs and competencies of implementing 
solution searches for different types of problem (via different search methods) differ 
across the few generic organizational modes. It follows naturally that high value 
solutions to a particular type of problem can be most efficiently organized by some 
specific organization mode. In the PSP literature, the discriminating alignment 
(Macher, 2006; Nickerson et al., 2004) dictates that markets are most suitable when 
problems are simple, decomposable and well-structured. Of the two types of hierarchy 
differentiated by Nickerson and Zenger (2004), the consensus-based hierarchy entails 
high organization costs and should only be adopted when the benefits from building 
consensus and developing collective heuristics are high, this being the case when the 
problem is highly complex, non-decomposable and ill-structured. The authority-based 
hierarchy is superior to markets in supporting heuristic search, but inferior in 
supporting directional search, so that it is most suited for problems that are averagely 
complex, nearly-decomposable and moderately ill-structured.  
2.3 A Firm’s Existing Knowledge Base 
Above, it is noted that the extent to which a problem is well-structured depends on 
how well the problem solvers are prepared for it. It should be emphasized that the idea 
can in fact be operationalized on two different levels, which, in our view, have 
distinct organizational consequences. On a collective level, whether a problem is 
well-structured depends on how much human beings as a whole know about the 
problem, and the extent to which they have developed corresponding techniques for 
solving it. This, as we understand it, is what is discussed in the previous section. On 
an individual level, given the ‘state of the art’ for solving a specific problem, whether 
and how well/fast a problem solver is able to find a solution also depends on how well 
this problem solver is equipped with relevant knowledge. In this sense, problem 
structure is solver-dependent, and consequently related to a firm’s existing knowledge 
base. It follows, more generally, that a given problem can pose radically different 
challenges for different problem solvers with different knowledge backgrounds, thus 
leading to different organization choices and performances. Similar points have been 
made by Macher and Boerner (2012) who contended that firms with more 
technological knowledge in relevant fields can improve performance not only via 
experiential learning by doing, which tends to favour the choice of internal 
development, but also through better supplier relationship management, which instead 
tends to favour the choice of markets, so that a firm’s technological knowledge base is 
“likely to have organization and performance implications that depend in part on the 
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structure of technological development” (Macher et al., 2012: p. 3). In other words, a 
firm’s existing knowledge base affects the organization and the performance of its 
problem solving activities, both through its independent effect 1  and through its 
interaction effect with the structure of the problem.  
With the exception of Macher and Boerner (2012), the possible linkage between a 
firm’s existing knowledge base and its organization choice is little discussed in the 
PSP literature. By contrast in the KBV, the organizational learning, and the 
innovation literatures, a firm’s existing knowledge base has been found, both 
theoretically and empirically, to have profound organizational consequences. Its 
implications for the organization of technological problem solving have also been 
explored (e.g. Zhang et al., 2007).  
As also noted by Macher and Boerner (2012), in the KBV literature the firm is 
conceptualized as an routine-based, history-dependent knowledge bearing social 
entity that adapts experimentally and incrementally to its past experiences (Penrose, 
1955). Its existing knowledge base provides the firm with more in place information 
filters (Arrow, 1974), absorptive capacity (Cohen et al., 1990), and routines (Nelson 
et al., 1982) that facilitate the integration of knowledge (Kogut et al., 1992) and 
improve problem solving efficiency in specific technological areas (Nelson et al., 
1982). Accordingly more experienced/knowledgeable firms achieve superior 
performance in technological development, irrespective of the mode of organization 
(Macher, 2006). More substantially, a more experienced/knowledgeable firm enjoys 
experiential learning-by-doing and uncertainty reduction performance advantages, so 
that it tends to in-source its technological development (Argote, 1999). More 
generally, in this literature it is firmly held that firms tend to internalize activities in 
which they have superior capabilities, and outsource those in which they have inferior 
capabilities (Argyres, 1996). Recent work (Coombs et al., 2000; Grant et al., 2004) 
also reveal that, in many cases, firms participate in various forms of alliance mainly to 
access external complementary knowledge/capabilities. A link between alliance 
participation and a firm’s knowledge base can thus be established.  
Applying the above insights in the context of technological problem solving, it can be 
argued that a firm with a higher level of knowledge in relevant fields is more likely to 
organize problem solving in-house rather than through markets, ceteris paribus. 
                                                
1 However the authors appear rather ambiguous regarding the organizational implications of a firm’s 
existing knowledge base as they stated that more experienced firms perform better both “in developing 
knowledge within and integrating knowledge across organizational boundaries” (Macher & Boerner, 
2012: p. 16, emphasis added), so that they have greater organizational flexibility in technological 
development. They appear agnostic as to whether a firm’s existing knowledge base has an independent 
impact on its organization choices, and they tend to believe that such an effect is neutral with respect to 
make-or-buy decisions. 
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Similarly, when a firm is trying to solve a complex problem, for which it has 
considerable knowledge but is nevertheless lacking in some critical knowledge 
direction, it would, depending on the attributes of the problem, leverage various forms 
of collaborative arrangements to access external complementary knowledge.   
2.4 Knowledge Tacitness and Social Distribution 
In the KBV of the firm tacit, contextually dependent, and socially distributed 
knowledge are of central explanatory importance. This theme is mainly developed by 
Kougut and Zander but can be traced back to Polanyi (1962, 1966).  
In a series of papers (1988; 1992, 1995, 1996), Kogut and Zander explore the 
boundary implications of tacit and socially distributed knowledge, with further 
development due to Langlois and others. (Hippel, 1994; Langlois, 1992; Langlois et 
al., 1999). As indicated by Langlois and Foss (1999), at the heart of these stories is 
the argument that productive knowledge is often hard to articulate and not possessed 
by any single mind. Instead, it is distributed among a group of interacting agents, 
emerging from the aggregation of the tacit knowledge elements they possess. 
Moreover, such knowledge is often contextually sensitive in that it can only be 
mobilized in the firm-specific context of carrying out a multi-person productive task. 
Therefore, when such knowledge is to be transferred across firm interfaces, a firm 
may have difficulty understanding the knowledge and capabilities held by another 
firm, and both firms separately and jointly may “know more than their contracts can 
tell” (Kogut and Zander 1992), thus adding to the contractual complications. In this 
context, the costs of negotiating and making contracts with potential partners, of 
teaching and educating the contractual counterparts, …, become very real factors that 
shape the firm boundary (Langlois, 1992), whereas such costs are rather independent 
of opportunism (Kogut, 1988). Relative transformation costs 2  of different firms, 
rather than transaction costs, seem to be the primary issue (Kogut et al., 1995). Firms 
tend to internalize the utilization of tacit and socially distributed knowledge as 
internalization economizes on the costs associated with its transmission (Kogut & 
Zander, 1992). This is possible not because firms can provide better incentive 
alignments, but because they can supply a set of “higher-order organizing principles 
of how to coordinate groups and transfer knowledge”3 (Kogut & Zander, 1992) that 
markets cannot offer, because coordination, communication, and learning “are 
                                                
2 The transformation (production) costs/transaction costs dichotomy was made by Wallis and North 
(1986). 
3 According to the authors, these “higher-order organizing principles” include, among others, “shared 
coding schemes”, “values”, and “a shared language”. They act as “mechanisms by which to codify 
technologies into a language accessible to a wider circle of individuals”; so that “varieties of functional 
expertise can be communicated and combined” (Kogut & Zander 1992: pp. 389-90) within the social 
community of the firm. 
Comment [JC1]: 803 words 
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situated not only physically in locality, but also mentally in an identity” (Kogut & 
Zander, 1996). 
Apart from the make-or-buy decision, similar reasoning has been applied to the 
choice of alliance governance (Kogut, 1988). In this literature it is generally argued 
that equity-based alliances are more effective than contract-based alliances for the 
transferring of tacit and socially embedded knowledge between partner firms, as 
equity-based alliances (in particular, joint ventures) tend to promote frequent and 
direct interactions, increase mutual understanding, enhance knowledge transparency, 
and offer better opportunities for interactive learning. The arguments have 
subsequently been developed by Heiman and Nickerson (2002, 2004) who 
incorporate the logics of the PSP and the TCE. They argue that inter-firm 
collaboration can be understood as a problem solving process involving the 
combining of the distinct knowledge sets of the participants, those often being tacit 
and socially distributed. Given the cognitive limitations of human beings, such 
knowledge characteristics can interact with problem complexity to pose significant 
challenges for the sharing/transferring of knowledge in the process of joint solution 
search. To overcome these challenges, various knowledge management practices (e.g., 
high-bandwidth communication channels and common communication codes) are 
often adopted. However, given opportunism, the adoption of these measures gives rise 
to higher knowledge appropriation hazards via increased knowledge transparency. 
Efficient inter-firm collaboration governance should therefore address the problems of 
knowledge transfer and knowledge expropriation jointly. They suggest that an equity-
based alliance can deal with both problems more effectively than a contract-based 
alliance. On the one hand, with the aid of the hierarchical structure and a whole 
package of coordination and administrative apparatuses, an equity-based alliance is 
better able to accommodate the afore-mentioned knowledge management practices, 
making it a superior vehicle for transferring/sharing complex knowledge. On the other 
hand, equity-based governance also provides better safeguards against 
misappropriation of knowledge as shared ownership tends to alleviate opportunistic 
incentives, increase monitoring, and enhance managerial controls.  
2.5 Hypotheses 
Based on the above review we have the hypotheses presented in Table 1, with 
reference to which we note the following.  
First, in the view of standard TCE (Williamson, 1991), collaborative arrangements 
(alliances) are generally regarded as ‘hybrid’ modes of organization lying somewhere 
between market and hierarchy along a hypothetical continuum. This implies that if a 
higher value of an explanatory variable favours the choice of in-house over 
Comment [JC2]: 858 words 
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outsourcing, it also favours the choice of in-house over alliance and the choice of 
alliance over outsourcing. In the PSP literature such a view has been adopted by 
Leiblein and Macher (2009) who argue that alliances (in particular, joint ventures) are 
better than markets in solving ill-structured or complex problems, but perhaps not 
suitable for the most ill-structured or complex problems in comparison to hierarchies. 
In this study, the default hypotheses are developed in this spirit.  
Secondly, in the TCE literature, it is also generally held that equity-based alliances are 
more hierarchical than contract-based alliances along the market-hierarchy continuum 
(Oxley, 1997). Hypotheses regarding the choice of any specific pair of organization 
modes could thus be inferred.  
Thirdly, the view that alliances are “hybrid” modes of organization has been 
questioned (e.g., Kay, 1997). As indicated by Kay (1997), a joint venture, presumably 
the most important ‘hybrid’ mode, is typically plagued by the problem of being the 
servant of several masters, with the implied contractual, control and appropriability 
problems all tending to exacerbate transaction costs relative to a pure hierarchy. In 
other words, a joint venture carries the burden of both hierarchical and market 
arrangements, tending to make its transaction costs greater than those of the 
corresponding pure forms. Much of the managerial literature also suggests that a joint 
venture is often viewed by managers as the most expensive mode of organization, a 
last resort dominated by other modes (Brechbuhl, 2006). In this view it is problematic 
to treat alliances (in particular, joint ventures) as ‘hybrid’. Rather, they should be 
viewed as an independent category of organization modes. Although such expansive 
modes are generally avoided, alliances, however, do offer some unique benefits—in 
particular, access to external to external complementary knowledge in the face of 
solving a non-decomposable, complex problem that is beyond the firm’s existing 
capabilities/knowledge base. It can therefore be argued that the likelihood of 
knowledge/capabilities bottlenecks increases with problem complexity, and such 
bottlenecks might be expected to lead the firm to referring to external sources for 
complementary knowledge, most possibly by forming alliances with other firms 
(Coombs et al., 2000). In the context of choosing between in-house and alliance, it 
seems reasonable to argue that the more complex the problem the less likely it can be 
solved internally, for lack of complete knowledge, and therefore the more likely the 
problem solving will be organized by alliance. In Table 1, some alternative 
hypotheses are developed in this spirit. In our view, these alterative hypotheses are 
consistent with the logics of the PSP and the KBV, although they are at odds with the 
‘hybrid’ view of alliances.  
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Finally, given space constraints and the focus of the article, we do not review the 
relevant TCE literature. For the few TCE variables included in this study we adopt 
rather standard TCE hypotheses.  Comment [JC3]: 587 words 
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Table 1: Summary of Hypotheses 
 
ǂ The multinomial logit model is discussed in section 4. The hypotheses here are expressed in 
terms of the signs of β2k (equity-based alliance), β3k (contract-based alliance), and β4k 
(outsourcing) in equation (4), where the k subscript corresponds to the explanatory variable 
under consideration. A negative (positive) βjk gives a negative (positive) entry in the table. 
The ‘hybrid’ view of alliance also dictates that β2k>β3k>β4k,. 
 
* Alternative hypothesis, stating that the more complex a problem is, the more likely that the 
problem solving will be organized by alliance rather than by in-house, ceteris paribus. By 
contrast, the default hypothesis states that the more complex a problem is, the more likely that 
the problem solving will be organized in-house rather than by alliance, ceteris paribus. 
Hypotheses regarding other variables can be formulated verbally in the same manner..  
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3. Empirical Setting 
3.1  Data Collection 
Data were collected by survey administered by structured interview. Some of the 
questions are adapted from previous studies (e.g., Kogut & Zander, 1993) whilst 
others are originally constructed to capture information on certain underexplored 
variables, in particular variables associated with the PSP. Obtaining responses from 
executives is often problematic with a survey, and the response rates for R&D related 
surveys are typically low (Mairesse et al., 2010). Given this, a private market research 
company with strong business connections to the targeted industry was contracted to 
help distribute the questionnaire and to conduct part of the interviews. 
In the survey, three types of information were collected. First, respondents were asked 
to give examples, based on the provided definitions, of the organization modes of 
their R&D projects involving an international element4. Secondly, respondents were 
asked to evaluate various attributes of these R&D projects using a pre-defined five 
point Likert scale. Thirdly, additional background information regarding the reported 
R&D project and the firm was also collected. 
To control for inter-industry differences, the sectoral coverage of the study was 
confined to the consumer electronics industry, which includes (a) PC and peripherals, 
(b) mobile handset and other personal communication devices, and (c) household 
appliances and audio/video equipment. 
The target response group of the survey were corporate informants with knowledge of 
their company’s project-level R&D activities, including corporate executives in 
charge of R&D, R&D directors, R&D project managers, senior R&D researchers, etc.  
The survey followed a rather standard procedure. The consultancy company complied 
from their database a list of consumer electronics companies that might have 
participated in international R&D5. Companies on the list were randomly selected, 
with a senior personnel in each selected company then being tentatively contacted by 
telephone to enquire into the possibility of survey participation. If rejected, the 
surveyors moved on to the next company on the list until the pre-set sample size6 was 
reached. In total 96 companies were contacted, with 50 agreeing to participate in the 
                                                
4 An international R&D project is defined as one that involves cooperation with a foreign partner, is 
undertaken in a foreign location, or is intended mainly to serve a foreign market. 
5 Given that small companies are less active in R&D (Acs and Audretsch, 1991), an annual turnover of 
$2 million was (arbitrarily) set as the threshold for choosing candidate companies. 
6 With reference to studies of similar nature and theme, and given the budget constraint, the minimum 
sample size was set at 140 R&D projects. 
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survey. From the 50 companies, 111 people were interviewed, and they provided 
detailed information on 142 international R&D projects. 
3.2 General Industrial Background 
There is little systematic information regarding the overall status of international 
R&D activities in the Chinese consumer electronics industry. Nevertheless, the 
following information revealed by previous studies can be used as a benchmark to 
evaluate the representativeness of our sample. Prior studies (e.g., Zhou et al., 2010) 
reveal that most of the manufacturing activities in this industry are highly 
concentrated in the following three mega-city regions: the Pearl River Delta (centered 
around Shenzhen and Dongguan), and, to a lesser extent, the Yangtze River Delta 
(centered around Shanghai and Suzhou), and the Bohai-Rim (centered around Beijing 
and Tianjin). The location of R&D activities in this industry is somewhat different. In 
the past two decades China’s manufacturing sector in general, and consumer 
electronics industry in particular, has witnessed the rapid globalization of innovation 
activities, with MNCs being widely recognized as the key driving force. (Boutellier et 
al., 2008). A large proportion of R&D activity in this industry can be related to R&D 
presence of MNCs in China, either independently or in cooperation with indigenous 
firms and institutions (Li et al., 2005). The innovative dynamics and the interaction 
between foreign and indigenous firms have been well-documented, both for the 
segment of PC and peripherals (e.g. Chen, 2004; Ernst, 2008), and for the segment of 
mobile handset and personal communication devices (e.g., Fan, 2006). Studies 
suggest that foreign R&D facilities in China are predominantly concentrated in 
Beijing and Shanghai7, with Tianjin, Suzhou and the Southern Cantonese cities of 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen as secondary locations (Boutellier et al., 2008). Moreover, 
it is found that R&D units with a research mission tend to locate themselves in 
Beijing, whereas development laboratories prefer to choose a location in, or in the 
vicinity of, Shanghai (Zedtwitz, 2004). 
Given the above background information, we believe the current sample is more or 
less representative of the population in terms of geographic and sectoral distribution, 
type of ownership, etc. (see Table 2). 
                                                
7 According to Boutellier et al. (2008), by September 2006, 67% of the 495 foreign R&D laboratories 
in China were located in Beijing and Shanghai. 
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Table 2: Distribution of the Sample by Sector, Location,  
Nature of Ownership and Organization Mode 
 
 
3.3 The Variables: Definition and Measurement 
3.3.1 Dependent Variable 
In this study, the dependent variable, organization mode, is an unordered discrete 
variable classified into three broad categories: in-house, collaborative arrangements 
(alliances) and outsourcing (arm’s-length like contract) (Robertson et al., 1998). 
When contract-based and equity-based collaborative arrangements are treated 
separately (Pisano, 1989), a total of four organization modes results, namely: 
In-house — the firm undertakes the R&D project internally. 
Outsourcing — the firm contracts out an R&D project to some other organization to 
find a solution for a technological problem. When a project is so organized it is 
essentially a ‘cash-for-technology’ exchange approximating an arm’s-length contract, 
with the solution typically being of a ‘ready-to-use’, ‘off-the-shelf’ nature which can 
be integrated into the firm’s existing system of operation with little adaptation. 
Collaborative arrangements (alliances) —which allows for a wide variety of ‘hybrid’ 
organization modes. In this study we distinguish between contract-based and equity-
based collaborative arrangements. In the first case no equity exchange is involved, 
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whereas in the second case partner firms refer to some equity-based arrangement as 
an umbrella structure to support their joint R&D projects, either setting up a joint 
venture and undertaking joint R&D projects in this new legal entity, or alternatively 
taking/cross-taking minority equity stakes to support such projects.  
Table 2: The Organization Modes of the Firms’ R&D activities 
 
3.3.2 Independent Variables 
All independent variables are measured using a five point Likert scale (see Table 1). 
Problem Structure (PS) Following Macher (2006), a well-structured problem is 
defined as one with a clear boundary of relevant knowledge sets, the interactions 
amongst which are well understood, so that there are explicit and widely accepted 
approaches for solving the problem. Conversely, for an ill-structured problem, the 
boundary of relevant knowledge sets is ambiguous, and the interactions amongst these 
sets are poorly understood, so that no widely-accepted approach for solving the 
problem exists. 
Complexity (Intensity of Knowledge Set Interaction) (COM) In this study, 
complexity (intensity of knowledge set interaction) and decomposability are treated as 
separate variables. A simple problem is defined as one involving few knowledge sets 
and a low level of interactions/interdependences amongst them. Conversely, a 
complex problem involves a large number of knowledge sets and extensive 
interactions/interdependences. 
Decomposability (DEC) A decomposable problem is defined as one that can be 
divided into sub-problems; each drawing on rather specialized knowledge so that it 
can be solved quite independently. Conversely, the knowledge sets interactions within 
a non-decomposable problem are so extensive that it is infeasible to define and solve 
sub-problems in a way that offers predictable advantages over random trials. For such 
problems, if a solution is to be found it has to be an overall solution. 
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Existing Knowledge-Base (EKB) A firm’s existing knowledge base for a given R&D 
project is defined as the extent to which a firm possesses all the relevant 
knowledge/capabilities required to solve the problem at the time of project initiation. 
Knowledge Tacitness Following Zander and Kogut (1995), knowledge tacitness is 
operationalized by the two dimensions of codifiability(COD) and teachability (TEA). 
Codifiability is defined as the extent to which it is easy to find/prepare relevant 
reference materials (e.g., books, blueprints, or manuals) in order to provide a new 
team member with most of the critical knowledge in an accessible way. Teachability 
is defined as the extent to which it is easy for a new team member to learn, by 
working with, and being mentored by, a skilled team member, the core knowledge 
and skills required to solve the problem.  
Social Distribution of Knowledge (SDK) The degree of social distribution of 
knowledge is defined as the extent to which the knowledge required to solve the 
problem is possessed by one or a few individual experts, as opposed to being widely 
distributed amongst a group of experts, so that no single expert can solve the problem. 
The definitions of the following TCE variables are rather standard. 
Demand Uncertainty (DU) Demand uncertainty (Robertson et al., 1998) is defined as 
the difficulty of forecasting the future demand for the product/service to which the 
R&D project under consideration is intended to contribute.  
Human Asset Specificity (HAS) and Physical Asset Specificity (PAS) In this study 
human asset specificity is defined as the extent to which the skills and knowledge 
developed/accumulated in the R&D project under consideration are useful outside the 
project. Physical asset specificity is defined as the extent to which the investment in 
physical assets to support the R&D project under consideration can be redeployed 
outwith the project. 
Appropriability (AP1 and AP2) In this study the appropriability of the relevant 
knowledge is defined as (AP1) the extent to which the R&D project under 
consideration can be easily imitated by an outsider (e.g., by reverse engineering or 
inventing around), and (AP2) the extent to which the departure of one or a few key 
R&D team members to a competitor would lead to substantial leakages of relevant 
knowledge to that competitor.  
4. Multinomial Analysis of the Organization Choices 
We start by assuming that the probability of project i being organized by mode j is 
given by  
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where ix  is a vector of characteristics of the i
th R&D project and the jβ  are unknown 
parameter vectors to be estimated. The second expression in (1) defines the 
multinomial logit model. Parameter estimation is typically, and is here, maximum 
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so that an increase in ikx  increases (decreases) 1/ij iP P , the likelihood of mode j 
relative to mode 1, when jkβ  is positive (negative). The slightly more general  
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allows the likelihood of mode j relative to mode m to be considered.  
The derivative in (4) leads to an interpretation of jkβ  as the proportionate change in 
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and on exp( )jkβ  as the implied multiplication when ikx  increases by one unit. The 
implied proportionate change in 1/ij iP P  is then exp( ) 1jkβ − . The value of exp( )jkβ  is 
reported as RRR (relative risk ratio) in table 3. Subtraction of one and multiplication 
by one hundred then gives the percentage change in 1/ij iP P implied by a unitary 
change in ikx . 
4.1 Multinomial Logit Estimation Results 
Using the 142 sample observations, we estimate a multinomial logit model explaining 
the choice between in-house, equity-based alliance, contract-based alliance, and 
outsourcing, with in-house being the base outcome. Table 3 presents the parameter 
estimates.  
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 Table 3: Multinomial Logit Estimation Results  
 
 
ǂ alternative hypothesis 
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Table 4: Classification Table  
 
Equity-based alliance 
For this alternative four variables are significant at the 10% level or better, three 
(EKB, COM, DEC) being KBV variables and one (AP2) being a TCE variable.  
The coefficient of EKB is negative and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that 
when a firm has increasingly more complete relevant knowledge, it is more likely that 
the problem solving will be organized in-house rather than by alliance.  
The coefficients for COM and DEC are both significant at the 5% level. The positive 
(negative) COM (DEC) coefficient suggest that, ceteris paribus, equity-based alliance 
is increasingly preferred to in-house as problem complexity increases, and in-house is 
increasingly preferred to equity-based alliance as problem non-decomposability 
increases.  
AP2 is the remaining significant variable, with the positive coefficient implying that a 
larger AP2 value increases the relative probability of choosing equity-based alliance 
over in-house. This result is at odds with theoretical prediction, as internal 
organization is generally believed to be the most efficient mode for overcoming the 
appropriability problem. Notice that AP2 is also significant, but with a negative 
coefficient, in the estimation results relating to contract-based alliance.  
Contract-based Alliance 
For this alternative four variables are significant at the 10% level or better, three 
(EKB, SDK and DEC) being KBV variables and one (AP2) being a TCE variable.  
 
Comment [JC5]: rules??? 
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SDK is significant at the 1% level for contract-based alliance but is not significant for 
equity-based alliance. The RRR values indicate that a unitary increase in SDK 
reduces the relative probability of choosing contract-based alliance and equity-based 
alliance (over in-house) by 52.8% and 8.9% respectively. Therefore, when an R&D 
project involves highly socially distributed knowledge, alliance in general, and 
contract-based alliance in particular, is less likely to be chosen over in-house. COM is 
not significant for contract-based alliance but is, at the 5% level, for equity-based 
alliance. The RRR values indicate that a unitary increase in COM increases the 
relative probability of choosing contract-based (equity-based) alliance over in-house 
by 115.7% (299.5%). Thus the effect of COM on contract-based alliance is both 
smaller and less significant than that on equity-based alliance. These results suggest 
that as the complexity of the problem to be solved increases alliance is increasingly 
more likely to be chosen over in-house, with a preference for equity-based alliance 
rather than contract-based alliance. Given that, unlike equity-based alliances, contract-
based alliances do not generally have access to such governance apparatus as high 
bandwidth communication channels, collocation of team members, and centralized 
administrative coordination, and that equity-based alliances are supported by 
enhanced incentive alignment associated with shared equity, it could be argued that of 
the two types of alliance, contract-based alliance is particularly not suitable for 
mobilizing socially distributed knowledge, and equity-based alliance is far more 
effective in dealing with more complex problem. 
The coefficient of AP2 is negative and significant at the 5% level. As noted earlier, its 
sign is opposite to that for equity-based alliance, suggesting that the two types of 
alliance differ dramatically in terms of the ability to cope with appropriability 
problems. Theoretically, the results might be partially8 justified on two grounds. First, 
equity-based alliances are supported by shared ownership, helping to moderate 
opportunistic inclinations of participating parties. Secondly, the administrative 
structure that comes with shared ownership also furnishes an equity-based alliance 
with enhanced administrative controls over unintended leakage of appropriable 
knowledge. These arguments point to a greater effectiveness of an equity-based 
alliance in dealing with appropriability problems.  
Outsourcing 
For this alternative three variables are significant at the 10% level or better, one (EKB) 
being a KBV variable and two (PAS, AP2) being TCE variables. Seemingly, 
transaction cost considerations play a more decisive role for the choice of outsourcing 
than for the other alternatives. 
                                                
8 The positive AP2 coefficient for equity-based alliance is inconsistent with theory and difficult to 
rationalise. 
 25 
The coefficient of EKB is again negative and significant at the 1% level, suggesting 
that a higher level of existing knowledge base favours the choice of in-house over 
outsourcing9. Similarly, the negative coefficients of PAS and AP2 suggest that as the 
physical assets invested to support an R&D project become more specific, and that as 
the relevant knowledge becomes more appropriable, it is more likely that the project 
will be organized internally rather than by outsourcing.  
In summary the model performs fairly well, with the overall ‘hit rate’ of 64.1% (see 
Table 4) being considerably higher than that of random prediction, 25%, and that 
implied by assigning all observations to the most common alternative, 43.96%. 
However, the poor ‘hit rate’ of 16.7% for the alternative of equity-based alliance 
should be noted.  
Intuition suggests that the two types of alliance should not be combined given that the 
coefficients of AP2 are of different signs, that a higher COM value favours the choice 
of both types of alliance over in-house, but with the increased probability going 
mostly to equity-based alliance, and that a higher SDK value has a stronger, and more 
significant, negative impact on the probability of choosing contract-based alliance 
rather than equity-based alliance. In fact a more formal approach is possible since it 
can be shown that the equality of all elements of vectors βi and βj, excepting the 
constant, implies categories i and j can be combined. Thus twelve restrictions are 
required if the two types of alliance are to be combined. Two test statistics are readily 
available to test these restrictions. A likelihood ratio test, χ2(12) = 18.17, has a p value 
of 0.111, implying that the null can be accepted at the 10% significance level. On the 
other hand a Wald statistic, χ2(12) = 25.48, has a p value of 0.013, implying the null is 
rejected at the 10% and 5% significance levels. On balance the evidence is perhaps 
rather against the combining of the two types of alliance. 
4.2 Predicted Probabilities and Marginal effects 
The above discussion considers probabilities relative to the base alternative of in-
house so that is not clear how the absolute probabilities of the four alternatives are 
affected by the change of variables. Indeed, it is a straightforward exercise to 
calculate the predicted probability for each alternative at different values of the 
explanatory variables, as shown in Figure 1. For example, sub-figure 1-1 shows how 
                                                
9 For other comparisons equation (5) is required. For example the coefficient of EKB for the alternative 
of contract-based alliance (outsourcing) is -2.259 (-2.965). It follows that the coefficient of this variable 
in a choice between contract-based alliance and outsourcing is 0.762, so that a higher EKB value 
increases the relative probability of choosing contract-based alliance over outsourcing. 
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the four probabilities change as EKB varies from one to five, with the other variables 
at their sample means. The other sub-figures are similarly constructed10. 
 
                                                
10 The variables chosen are those estimated to be significant in Table 3. 
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Figure 1: The Effects of the Point-by-Point Increase of Selected 
Variables on the Predicted Probability of Each Alternative 
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Figure 1-1 suggests the two types of alliance are similarly affected by variation in 
EKB, with an initially increasing, and finally decreasing probability. Outsourcing is 
the most likely alternative at low EKB and in-house is the most likely alternative at 
high EKB. For intermediate values of EKB alliance, in particular contract-based 
alliance, is most likely. Therefore, when a firm is confronted with a problem for 
which it has little background knowledge, outsourcing is most likely to be chosen as 
the organization mode, whereas with a high level of background knowledge, problem 
solving is most likely to be organised internally. Between these two polar situations 
alliances are most likely to be chosen, with a preference for contract-based alliance. 
Figure 1-2 suggests that the probability of the equity-based alliance is more sensitive 
to variation in COM than is the probability of the contract-based alliance, with the 
first probability being substantially larger when COM equals five. Outsourcing is 
most likely to be chosen for solving problems of lowest complexity and equity-based 
alliance is most likely for solving the most complex problems. For problem of 
intermediate complexity, internal organization is the most likely choice. 
In Figure 1-3 the probability of in-house increases substantially with DEC. At the 
same time the probabilities of either type of alliance decrease, with the impact of 
increasing DEC being more marked for equity-based alliance compared to contract-
based alliance. DEC seems to have little impact on the probability of outsourcing.  
In Figure 1-4 we find that SDK has a rather slight positive effect on the probability of 
equity-based alliance and a more pronounced negative effect on the probability of 
contract-based alliance. The probability of in-house increases monotonically with 
SDK. Overall, the results tend to suggest that to mobilize socially distributed 
knowledge, some sort of hierarchical structure is needed, whether it be a pure internal 
hierarchy or some other equity-based arrangement. An R&D project involving highly 
socially distributed knowledge is most likely to be organized internally. 
Figure 1-5 shows that increasing PAS tends to increase the probabilities of in-house 
and equity-based alliance and decrease the probabilities of contract-based alliance and 
outsourcing. Its opposite impact on the two alliance probabilities serves to emphasise 
the distinctions between the two types of alliance. As argued within TCE, with the 
support of shared ownership, equity-based alliances can provide superior incentive 
alignment and better administrative controls, thus helping overcome problems of asset 
specificity more effectively than contract-based alliances (Anderson et al., 1986). Our 
result tends to support such an argument.  
Figure 1-6 suggests that AP2, another TCE variable, has broadly similar effects to 
PAS, with an increase in AP2 tending to increase the probabilities of in-house and 
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equity-based alliance and decrease the probabilities of contract-based alliance and 
outsourcing. The results tend to support the view that in-house and equity-based 
alliance are more effective in coping with the appropriability problem than contract-
based alliance or outsourcing (Oxley, 1997), for the same sort of reasons mentioned 
above. However, in Figure 1-6, equity-based alliance is twice as likely as in-house 
when AP2 equals to five. This result is at odds with the predictions of TCE theory, 
wherein hierarchy is viewed as the most effective mode for dealing with the 
appropriability problem. 
4.3 Testing of the IIA Assumption 
One frequently noted implication of the MLM is the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) property, wherein probability ratios ij ikP P  are unchanged when 
alternatives are added or removed. If IIA were thought inappropriate on theoretical 
grounds then a different specification to the MLM would have to be considered. One 
such specification is the multinomial probit model (MPM)11, although estimation of 
the MPM is very complicated for all but small J. In fact the Hausman and McFadden 
(HM) statistic (Hausman et al., 1984) is frequently presented as a test of the IIA 
property after MLM estimation. It is based on a comparison of the MLM parameter 
estimates with the estimates obtained when choice categories are removed and 
estimation is repeated. We obtain12 the results in Table 5, where each value is judged 
by reference to the 2χ (26) distribution since only 26 of the full set of 39 parameters 
are re-estimated when a single category is removed. Given this, none of the values in 
Table 4 leads to rejection of IIA. This conclusion takes the negative value to not 
indicate evidence against IIA13, this seemingly being the most common approach. In 
fact Hausmann and McFadden (1984) mention an alternative calculation which is 
guaranteed to be positive and which has recently been advocated by Vijwerberg 
(2011). This alternative calculation 14  seems to leads to significant values and 
therefore raises doubts about the MLM. Notwithstanding this, we retain the MLM 
results.  
                                                
11 Both MLM and MPM are additive random utility models wherein utility ijU  = ij ijV ε+ , with ijV  
( ijε ) being the deterministic (random) component of utility, and with the j witch lead to a maximum of 
the ijU  being selected by agent i. MLM and MPM differ in the assumptions made about the 
distribution of ijε across i and j. In either case, when discussing the choice of organization, the utility 
maximisation story might be recast in terms of cost minimisation.  
12 All the estimation is done using STATA which automatically presents the HM values of Table 5. 
13 Recall that  a 2χ  cannot be negative. 
14 Programming is required here. We used GAUSS. 
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Table 5: Results of Hausman Tests of IIA Assumption  
 
 
4.4 Discussion 
Complexity, Decomposability and Problem structure 
The empirical results suggest that problem complexity and decomposability are 
important shaper of a firm’s R&D organization choice, while the effects of problem 
structure are less evident.  
For both types of alliance DEC has a significantly negative coefficient, suggesting 
that non-decomposable problems are more likely to be solved in-house than by 
alliance because such problems are more effectively dealt with through the extensive 
knowledge exchange characteristic of internal organization. By contrast, the 
coefficient of COM is significant, and positive, only for equity-based alliance, 
suggesting, rather counterintuitively given general PSP arguments, that more complex 
problems are more likely to be solved by equity-based alliance rather than in-house. 
Overall, the results are mixed. On the one hand, there is support for the PSP argument 
(Heiman & Nickerson 2004) that in-house is more effective for solving non-
decomposable problems, and that the more hierarchical equity-based alliance is more 
likely to be chosen over contract-based alliance when problem solving complexity is 
high. On the other hand, the results indicate that COM and DEC’s effects on the 
probability of choosing equity-based alliance are in opposite directions, contradicting 
the PSP view that they are two concomitant properties of the same factor (Nickerson 
and Zenger, 2004). Relatedly, it is also suggested that, contrary to the general PSP 
prediction, equity-based alliance is even more likely to be chosen over in-house to 
solve a more complex problem.  
A Firm’s Existing Knowledge Base 
The results in Table 3 suggest that a firm’s existing knowledge-base is the most 
important single explanatory variable. When a firm is confronted with a problem for 
which it has much (little) relevant knowledge, it tends to organize the problem solving 
internally (by outsourcing). Between these two extremes alliances are most likely to 
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be chosen, with the contract-based alliance being the more preferred. These results are 
generally in line with the RBV and the bulk of empirical evidence in the RBV 
literature (e.g., Argyres, 1996; Bigelow et al., 2008; Madhok, 2002; Poppo et al., 
1998), which clearly indicates that a firm’s existing knowledge base has a strong 
independent effect on its organization choice. 
Knowledge Tacitness and Social Distribution 
In contrast to most existing relevant studies (e.g., Heiman et al., 2004; Kogut et al., 
1993; Mowery et al., 1996) the estimation results show that knowledge tacitness is 
not significant for any of the choices. Social distribution (embeddedness) of 
knowledge is however estimated to be a significant determinant for the choice 
between in-house and contract-based alliance, where the more socially distributed the 
knowledge is the more likely in-house is to be chosen as the organization mode. 
Further, it seems that of the two types of alliance, contract-based alliance is 
particularly unsuitable for mobilizing socially distributed knowledge. The results are 
broadly consistent with the ‘received wisdom’ of relevant theoretical (Langlois et al., 
1999) and empirical (e.g., Heiman et al., 2004) literature.  
Overall, the above results tend to suggest, tacitness in itself does not necessarily 
constitute a barrier to inter-firm knowledge transfer. Logically tacit knowledge can be 
knowledge embedded in a single mind, so that it can be mobilized on a personal level. 
A firm thus does not have to refer to formal governance mechanisms to access such 
knowledge, “learning by hiring away” will suffice (Chesbrough, 2003). By contrast 
socially-distributed knowledge has seemingly clearer governance ramifications as 
such knowledge, by definition, can only be mobilized on a collective level. We 
therefore suggest that future research should try to differentiate personal tacit 
knowledge from socially distributed tacit knowledge.  
TCE Variables 
Both in terms of the magnitude of effect and the level of significance, it appears that 
TCE variables are less important than the PSP and the KBV variables in the current 
sample. Both PAS and AP2 are significant, at the 5% level and 10% level respectively, 
for the choice between in-house and outsourcing, and AP2 is also significant, at least 
at the 10% level, for the remaining organizational choices. However the positive AP2 
coefficient for the alternative of equity-based alliance is at odds with theoretical 
prediction and is, therefore, difficult to explain. 
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In summary it seems fair to conclude that each theoretical perspective receives some 
support from our results but that, in general, the various PSP and KBV variables are 
of more explanatory importance than the TCE variables. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the PSP of the boundary determination of the firm, both 
theoretically and empirically. On the basis of a review of existing PSP literature it is 
argued that knowledge-set interaction and decomposability are conceptually 
distinguishable and should be treated as separate variables. With reference to other 
closely related literature, it is also argued that a firm’s existing knowledge can be 
expected to be important in the organization of its problem solving activities, 
notwithstanding that  this dimension has been ignored in the existing PSP literature.  
In the empirical setting of the Chinese consumer electronics industry we examine the 
underlying determinants of a firm’s organisation choice for its R&D (technological 
problem solving) activities. Existing knowledge base is found to be the most 
significant variable in explaining the choice. Problem complexity and 
decomposability are also found to be important, with their effects not always being in 
the same direction. Non-decomposability tends to favour the choice of in-house while 
complexity tends to favour the choice of equity-based alliance. These results 
seemingly support the argument that complexity and decomposability should be 
treated as separate variables. It also suggests that, as far as the costs and competencies 
of governing different types of problem solving are concerned, alliances are probably 
not ‘hybrid’ modes of organization. Finally, whilst some TCE variables are found to 
be significant for certain organization choices, the results are relatively more 
supportive of the PSP and the KBV than of TCE. 
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